Ciencia forense en los tribunales

El tema de la admisibilidad de una prueba científica en un tribunal, es una cuestión delicada, ya que puede estar siendo usada como instrumento totalitario para meter en prisión a hombres por consideraciones más políticas que judiciales como consecuencia de la instrumentalización política de lo que es científico o no. Piénsese en las pruebas de brujería practicadas por la Santa Inquisición.

Un caso concreto de aberrante aplicación son las "técnicas de credibilidad del testimonio" y las técnicas de "idoneidad parental" empleadas por nuestros psicólogos adscritos a los juzgados de familia, con pretendido valor científico y que no son más que técnicas de corte inquisitorial y nazi empleadas para asignar custodias y pisito a la mujer o a hombres con "influencia", y que por supuesto, carecen del rigor necesario para ser utilizados como prueba en un tribunal o juzgado en un estado de derecho.

Para que una prueba pueda ser considerada como científica, tendrían que tener estas características:

1. Debería ser falsable: deberían ser expresados de tal forma que sus contenidos fueran contrastables y medibles.
2. La teoría debe ser revisada y analizada por los colegas.
3. El margen de error de la técnica o bien conocido o bien que se le presuma debe ser expresado
4. Los estándares que gobiernan su aplicación forense deberían ser conocidos y usados
5. La técnica sea aceptada por la comunidad científica, internacional, claro. Lo que diga Lorente Acosta y la Aido, es irrelevante en estos términos y sólo sirven para probar la interferencia política en la vida judicial. Los jueces saben así, claramente, lo que el poder político espera de ellos.

La Justicia Española, por llamarla con su nombre oficial, es diferente y nada de esto le preocupa, así tenemos que los jueces emplean técnicas de credibilidad del testimonio basadas en el técnicas de lenguaje no verbal, los psicólogos emplean él terrorífico CBCA-SVA y los psicólogos adscritos a los juzgados de familia, técnicas misteriosos y carentes de cualquier garantía básica para darle la custodia a quien venga bien que se construyen, bajo la apariencia de cientifidad, en base a la doctrina fundamentalista de género, "sugiriendo" custodias a la madre, o por cuestiones de poder y dinero, que en algunos casos puede ser el padre, burlando así el tan cacareado y masacrado bien supremo del menor, eso sí, siempre frente a una apariencia de rigor capaz de convencer sólo a estómagos agradecidos o mentes ligeras de rigor científico.

Alguno pensará que estamos hablando de ideas extremas o demasiado "raras". Como prueba del rigor con el que se trata en otros países estos temas, tenemos el Informe del Parlamento Británico en html y en pdf. También tenemos al Consejo de Europa con el Informe de Scientific evidence in Europe – Admissibility, appraisal and equality of arms by Christophe Champod and Joëlle Vuille School of Criminal Science, Faculty of Law and Criminal Science, University of Lausanne, Switzerland.

¿Cómo se resuelve esta problemática en España?. Con una técnica que rebasa, incluso, las técnicas inquisitoriales para acercarse a las nazis, englobadas en un concepto que Hitler no acertó a acuñar pero sí el mundo judicial hispano: "La sana crítica del juez", útil para dar cobertura a toda clase de violación sistemática de derechos fundamentales del ser humano.

He de confesar que he hablado con algún miembro de universidades españolas para que traten este tema y con algún juez, pero superada la corteza de intelectualidad con la que se rodean, hemos encontrado un vacío intelectual de dimensiones tan galácticas que asusta. No obstante, como no todas las mentes judiciales y asimiladas están tan vacías, confiaremos que alguna que pueda leer estas líneas, pueda ser estimulada y a la que le pediremos, con firmeza, que se arme de valentía y plante cara a la parte del sistema judicial que se basa en técnicas nazis e inquisitoriales.

Presentamos a continuación una lista de casos que se pueden encontrar en Internet, relacionados con este tema. Por supuesto, todos ellos en inglés. Como decíamos el mundo judicial hispano, lo arregla todo con la sana crítica del juez. Estos son los casos:

El "snaggletooth killer", "DNA & Bite Mark Analysis",  "CTS Statement on the use of Proficiency Testing Data for Error Rate Determinations", "Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science".

Nada en castellano y no por ello menos importante para el ciudadano español, a pesar del pasotismo judicial español, que conlleva que hoy nadie tenga motivos serios para sentirse seguro con la mal-llamada Justicia Española.

A modo de resumen señalamos algunas afirmaciones que son hechas en el informe del Consejo Europeo y que hemos trasladado al final de esta entrada, íntegramente en inglés. Entre las afirmaciones que hace dice:

1. Las partes deben interactuar con el experto de una forma transparente. La práctica actual en los juzgados españoles es la opacidad. El psicólogo de turno adscrito al juzgado de familia no ofrece a las partes trascripción alguna de lo dicho ni grabación, ni límites de las técnicas empleadas, ni estándar en el que basa su aplicación. La opacidad y la sustitución de la ciencia por dogma es lo habitual.

2. Las partes deberán poder presentar hipótesis de trabajo para que sean consideradas. Aquí la mentira y el engaño es lo habitual, cuando se mencionan temas como la Alienación Parental, presente en muchas denuncias falsas y usado para desvincular a padres e hijos. Lo mismo dicen que han comprobado (sin mencionar como) que no existe Alienación Parental en casos de denuncia de abusos sexuales inexistentes, como que te afirman que la Alienación Parental no es posible ya que no existe. Aunque las fórmulas de engaño empleadas en los tribunales son simples, suelen ser eficaces ya que los jueces tienden a dejarse engañar con gran facilidad, cuando no toman parte activa en el engaño. Todo ello es posible porque la última voz, la de los ciudadanos, está tan alejada de la realidad judicial que nada hacen para poner coto a tal desmadre.

3. Reconocen que los "expertos designados por los jueces y tribunales" suelen ser contrarios a los derechos de la defensa. Aquí se les idolatra. En los procesos de corte inquisitorial, no hay cultura de cuestionar a los expertos porque los abogados temen represalias por parte de los jueces. Lo cierto es que cuando se trata de cuestionar los métodos inquisitoriales de los psico-pájaros/ jueces españoles en temas de valoración de custodias o en temas de credibilidad del testimonio con el uso del CBCA-SVA, los jueces protegen a los psico-pájaros de sus mentiras afirmando que no se está para "criticar" los métodos periciales. Hay que mantener el status-quo, ya que ni los jueces entienden lo que hacen los psicólogos ni los psicólogos tienen interés en destapar la podredumbre con la que trabajan y en base a la que se condena, incluidos a inocentes. Eso cuando no se convierten en expertos forenses utilizando técnicas de credibilidad del testimonio desacreditadas por la práctica científica, práctica denominada por el Juez del Tribunal supremo como justicialismo.

4. ¿Cómo cuestionar el trabajo de un forense cuando sólo existe uno, tal como ocurre en los procedimientos inquisitoriales?. Es lo que ocurre en España, habitualmente, con el único informe del psico-pájaro adscrito al juzgado de familia o el que hace un informe de credibilidad del hijo al que se dice abusado por el padre biológico, que habitualmente son falsas alegaciones, y que confirma lo inexistente sin permitirte el más leve cuestionamiento. Por desgracia es más habitual de lo deseable, aunque viene muy bien al justicialismo de género español.

5. El informe también afirma que  las notas de los peritos han de ponerse a disposición del juzgado y de las partes. Parece obvio y evidente, menos en España donde habitualmente se ocultan para no permitir entrar la crítica. Por ejemplo en los informes de valoración de custodia y de abusos sexuales con el CBCA-SVA, donde por interés del psico-pájaro no se graban las sesiones inquisitoriales y sugerentes a las que, habitualmente, se somete al menor, y que ni el juez ni el fiscal quieren saber nada, pues que se suelen conformar con no saber. La "sana crítica del juez", lo arregla todo.

6. Dice también, el informe, que una buena crítica depende más de la voluntad del juez, lo que resulta obvio. La ausencia de esa crítica en las sentencias demuestra la ignorancia de estos jueces.

7. Finalmente señalamos el principio de no pasarse la patata caliente, cuando dicen que los psicólogos hacen el informe y son los jueces los que valoran, y estos que se atienen a lo que dicen los psicólogos, sin querer ver que unos dicen lo que los otros no son capaces de entender, y de eso nadie parece ser responsable. Un caso claro es cuando los psico-pájaros incumple en código 24 no haciendo referencia a las limitaciones de la técnica e incumplen el 48 no dando tasa de certidumbre alguno. Los psicólogos mejor no darlo y para los jueces mejor no preguntar y para los derechos del ajusticiable, que le den morcillas, ya que lo importante no es respetar los derechos fundamentales sino aparentar que ...

Si comparamos lo expresado en ese informe con la práctica judicial habría que concluir que la nuestra es una práctica inquisitorial.

Preparing the expert evidence

• A greater defence input
  Throughout the period of preparation of the expert evidence and as early as possible in the proceedings, the parties should be able to interact with the expert in a transparent fashion. The parties should not be authorised to be present when the scientific tests are being conducted, since this might interfere with the smooth running of the operation, but they must be allowed to submit working hypotheses that the expert should take into account. We are emphasising here the role of the defence, but naturally experts must also receive appropriate information from the prosecuting authorities.

• Court-appointed experts
  Many lawyers and scientists operating in accusatorial systems see the notion of court-appointed experts as a miracle solution. We are more sceptical, since experience shows that such experts generally work more with the criminal prosecution authorities than with the defence, and the latter often find it difficult to find an alternative expert of equivalent status.
  Moreover, the neutrality of court-appointed experts gives them de facto a privileged status in that they have the almost total confidence of the court. Add to this the fact that in inquisitorial-type proceedings, there is no "culture" of questioning the word of experts, since defence lawyers have the impression that this could be seen by judges as criticising their choice and therefore be counter-productive for the defence case. Such a system does not therefore contribute to a critical assessment of expert reports and is not sufficient, we believe, to ensure that scientific evidence will receive a rational appraisal.
  We do, however, see advantages in employing court-appointed experts to assist courts to assess complex issues involving conflicting evidence presented by the parties. This is the compromise advocated by Patenaude (2003, pp. 170-171) in Canada.

• Pre-trial conferences and joint expertise, and multiple expert witnesses (hot-tubbing). Joint expertise is where different experts whose conclusions are likely to diverge meet outside of the court to identify areas of agreement and then submit to that court only evidence that is still the subject of debate. This saves time by only presenting to the courts contested items of evidence, and also helps the defence because each expert is forced to assess the other's point of view.
  Joint hearings of experts, or so-called hot-tubbing, mean that all the experts are heard in court at the same time. Each presents his or her findings in turn and can then comment on what the others have said. The judge and the parties have an opportunity to ask questions, and the whole process continues informally so that points of agreement and disagreement can be clearly identified.
  Such approaches are attractive, but are only significant when the parties or the authorities have commissioned several experts, whose conclusions differ. This does not resolve the problem of how to assess expert evidence when only one expert has been called – which is often the case with inquisitorial proceedings – and no one challenges his or her conclusions.

• Give precedence to written reports
  Since scientific evidence is often very complex, it is much easier for the parties to understand, even in countries using the accusatorial system, when it comes in written form, setting out the steps in the process and the findings. It may also be worth encouraging the use of visual aids such as photos and diagrams to back up written or oral explanations.
  Finally, in the interests of transparency, experts should be asked to make their laboratory notes available to the court and the parties (even if they are not made a formal part of the case-file, as in inquisitorial proceedings) during the procedure and when they give evidence in court.

Assessing expert evidence

• Standards of interpretation
  There should be a standard for the scientific interpretation of results to serve as a guide to the framing of expert reports, the terminology to be used and how conclusions should be expressed.
  It should be disseminated both among experts and the courts, with appropriate training.

• Making lawyers more aware of the fallibility of expert evidence and the notion of interpretation.
  A good understanding of scientific evidence depends less on the criteria that are adopted than on the willingness of courts to assess critically the material presented to them. Significant efforts must be made to make all those involved in the judicial system fully aware of the weaknesses of forensic reports. However well developed a technique may be, it still has to be applied by humans and errors are always possible. The parties must be aware of this and adopt a critical approach to such reports and the courts must also be conscious of the need to give proper weight to such evidence.
  But experts' work does not end with the reading of their analytical findings. The significance of scientific evidence in any particularly case is always subject to interpretation and this cannot be placed within the close confines of an ISO accreditation. When the evidence is taken it has be seen in the general context of the case and there has to be close communication between the expert and the court to ensure that the former provides the latter with useful information and that the latter does not form an exaggerated opinion of the expert's conclusions.
  This has to be seen in relation to court-appointed experts. It is not sufficient for the court to rely on the confidence it has in its expert. Nor do joint expert reports and joint hearings of experts offer any solution to this problem.

Supra-national approaches

• A scientific evidence assessment committee
  One possibility might be to establish a European body on the lines of the British Forensic Science Advisory Council and Forensic Science Regulator to act as the main adviser to political and judicial authorities on the reliability of the scientific techniques that are used. This is the position adopted by Alldridge (1992b) following his analysis of DNA evidence. In line with technological developments, certain forms of scientific evidence come to be seen by those involved in the judicial field as almost infallible. The more a particular form of scientific evidence is deemed, of itself, to be critical, the more necessary it becomes to subject it to the rigorous assessment of an independent body.
  Such a body would not have binding powers, but could nevertheless issue recommendations to domestic courts that would assist judges when they had to rule on the admissibility of a new forensic technique or the reliability of a new form of evidence, or when it seemed appropriate to abandon a form of evidence that had become obsolete. Such a procedure would take time, which would be quite welcome to certain figures who consider that the judicial system should keep its distance from "cutting edge scientific discoveries". As Patenaude has remarked (2003, p. 180), the idea is not a new one. It was indeed included in the statutes of the International Academy of Criminalistics, founded in 1929.

• An international panel of experts
  As we have seen, the number of experts that the courts can call on is often limited. The result is that in any particular geographical area it may be difficult to find an expert who specialises in the field in question and therefore impossible to find an expert for the defence, or simply a private scientific consultant, in the same field and with the same level of experience. It would undoubtedly improve the situation if domestic courts could call on the services of other European experts. The aim would be to establish a European register of experts with its own machinery for registering individuals and recognising laboratories, to ensure that there was a sufficient number of experts available in the increasingly varied fields of forensic science.

• Code of Ethics
  A European ethical code for all forensic experts would have particular symbolic significance. It might require those concerned:

  •  to perform their duties in a neutral and impartial fashion, on behalf of the court rather than either of the parties;

  •  to take account of all relevant information in carrying out their work;

  •  to describe clearly the facts and observations on which their opinion was based and report any gaps in the initial data that made it impossible to reach any definitive conclusions;

  • to refuse to reply to questions that fell outside their sphere of responsibility, or which only the court was competent to answer;

  • to advise the court immediately of any change of opinion on the substance of their conclusions, after reporting to or being heard by the court;

  • to provide the court, on request, with their personal notes and any other documentation relevant to the case.

• Saks (1989) provided an overview of ethics codes that existed at the end of the 1980s. The need for such a code of ethics was also one of the specific recommendations of the National Research Council (2009) report. The ENFSI also has a code of conduct that includes some of the aforementioned elements. It simply needs to be made more generally applicable.
  The increasingly significant advances in the field of scientific evidence are posing fresh challenges to domestic legal systems because of the additional problems they raise in terms of equality of arms, and more specifically the ability of the defence to call on the services of forensic experts of the same standard as those available to the criminal prosecution authorities.
  We believe that this calls for a thorough review of the law on how scientific evidence should be presented and assessed by the courts. Given the speed with which forensic techniques are evolving and the day-today constraints on the activities of the courts – lack of time, material resources and personnel and the range of cases they have to deal with – it is unreasonable to expect judges, prosecutors and counsel to reach a conclusion on issues that are still sometimes the subject of debate in the scientific community itself. We are conscious of strong pressure to adopt criteria similar to the Daubert standard to determine whether scientific evidence is admissible. We have reservations about such an approach. The guidelines laid down in the Daubert decision have some merit but they place a considerable burden on judges who completely lack the technical knowledge to apply them properly. We believe that some of the avenues previously explored offer more effective ways of dealing with the challenges of forensic science for the criminal justice system.
  One final lesson is provided by the early use of DNA in the courts. If DNA analysis is now considered to be a highly safe forensic technique, this is because in the 1990s the courts, and in particular defence lawyers, put great pressure on forensic experts and the prosecution authorities who employed them.
  Much effort went into improving their practices and demonstrating that it was a reliable technique before this form of evidence was deemed admissible. Yet in many other areas, forensic experts have failed to address their own shortcomings and the courts should no longer accept evidence whose reliability has not been established. The criminal justice system is forensic science's one and only client and it must therefore insist on a product that fully matches its needs.